Committee Jurisdiction and Internet Intellectual Property Protection by deFigueiredo, John
  
 
Committee Jurisdiction and Internet Intellectual Property Protection  
 
 
John M. de Figueiredo 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Harvard Law School and NBER 
 
Sloan School of Management E52-546 
50 Memorial Drive 
Cambridge MA 02142-1347 
jdefig@mit.edu 
 
 
May 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the impact of increasingly common congressional committee jurisdictional 
turf wars on policy outcomes.  It develops a theoretical model that shows how legislators balance 
the benefits of expanded committee jurisdiction against preferred policy outcomes, yielding 
predictions that are different from the traditional committee-dominance theories.  The theory 
predicts that a) senior members, and members who are in safe districts are most likely to challenge 
another committee’s jurisdiction; b) policy proposals may be initiated off the proposer’s ideal 
point in order to obtain jurisdiction over an issue; c) in many cases, policy outcomes will be more 
moderate with jurisdictional fights than they would be without these turf wars.  The paper tests the 
implications of the theory examining proposed Internet intellectual property protection legislation 
to reform electronic database law in the 106th Congress.   
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“There is forever a jurisdictional flare-up between the Commerce Committee and Judiciary 
Committee on [Internet] issues.  [The Bliley bill] was very artfully drafted to invoke jurisdiction 
on their part.” 
-- Judiciary staffer quoted in Newsbytes, 12 Oct 2000 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Congressional committees, as gatekeepers of policy, have enormous power to determine 
the shape of proposed legislation that reaches the House floor.  Scholars have elucidated many 
reasons why the full membership of Congress might delegate its power to constituent 
committees.  These include that committees offer advantages in cost-effectively obtaining and 
disseminating information (Krehbiel 1992; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989), in avoiding cycling in 
voting and promoting compromise and log-rolling through the politically efficient distribution of 
rents to constituencies (Weingast and Marshall 1988; Krutz 2001), and encouraging legislators to 
engage in long-term reputation building to create better information for voters (Kroszner and 
Strattman 1998, 2000).  All of these models, however, have an underlying assumption:  all 
jurisdictional boundaries for committees are static and clearly defined for all issues.  There is no 
ambiguity as to the single committee that exercises agenda-setting power over any given bill. 
In practice, however, committee jurisdictional boundaries are fluid and ambiguous 
Baumgartner et al (2000).1  In order to increase power, committees attempt to expand jurisdiction 
to issues on the periphery of other committees’ jurisdiction  (King 1997).   In addition, new 
issues and technologies come about where there is no clear responsible committee (e.g. nuclear 
power, computing, Internet).  These jurisdictional “turf wars” between committees over 
                                                 
1 Baumgartner et al (2000) show a strong increasing trend toward jurisdictional ambiguity and overlap among 
committees. 
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continuing and new issues can have a profound impact on the behavior of legislators and the 
outcomes of policies not considered by the previous theoretical and empirical literature.2  For 
example, while static boundaries lead to monopoly agenda-setting power and policy for the 
controlling committee that may lead to extreme policy, jurisdictional fights between committees 
introduce additional gatekeepers into the calculus that often results in more moderate policy, or 
no policy at all (retention of the status quo).  
This paper examines how jurisdictional conflict between committees creates policy 
equilibria that are not predicted by previous models.  By modeling legislators and committees as 
foresightful and strategic, the paper considers which congressional actors have incentive to 
challenge jurisdiction, and how these potential challenges affect the policy positions of the two 
committees engaged in a jurisdictional turf war.  While the handful of previous papers in the area 
have described the phenomenon of jurisdictional conflict (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, King 
1997, Hardin 1998) they have not modeled the process of jurisdictional challenge, and have not 
considered how such challenges actually affect policy outcomes. 3  If jurisdictional turf wars 
result in no differences in policy outcomes than the standard committee-monopoly-power 
                                                 
2 For a sociological account of jurisdiction in professions that mirrors this paper, see Abbott (1988). 
3 A small literature has explored the jurisdictional “turf wars” that occur between committees.  The first reason cited 
for turf wars are shocks to voter preferences, leading to pressure on committees to redefine policy in alternative 
ways.  This leads to new committees, with ideologies more congruent with the “new world,” to encroach upon the 
jurisdiction of the incumbent committee (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Jones et al 1993).  The second reason for 
turf wars cited is informational.  Hardin (1998) argues that jurisdictional encroachments are used by “challenging” 
committees to obtain (audit) the private information that incumbent committees might have on the policy’s effect on 
the challenging committee’s constituents.  Finally, King (1997) argues that “turf wars” are the result of political 
entrepreneurs attempting to expand jurisdiction through the common law jurisdiction systems of bill referral 
precedent, rather than formal House rules of jurisdiction, for distributional reasons.   
    While these theories describe various reasons for jurisdictional encroachment from bill introduction and 
sponsorship, they do not consider three important areas.  First, they generally considers only the actions of the 
challenger committees and not the incumbent committees, because the theories tend to consider incumbent 
committees that act without foresight of these jurisdictional challenges.  That is, if jurisdictional turf wars by 
challengers are a part of life, then one would expect incumbent committees to take this into account when 
considering their responses to turf wars.  Second, committees are not unitary actors, and individual legislators will 
have differing incentives to engage in turf wars.  Thus, who within committees might have the incentive to engage in 
jurisdictional turf wars, and why?  Finally, the literature fails to link jurisdictional fights with policy outcomes. 
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models, then they are of muted interest as a topic and a field.  If jurisdictional turf wars result in 
large swings in policy outcomes, then the literature is quite sparse relative to its importance to 
policy.   
The paper begins by developing a theory of jurisdiction with forward-looking committees 
and legislators.  From the theory predictions are generated related to the incentives to introduce 
new bills and the eventual policy proposals and outcomes.  We consider under what conditions 
compromise will be likely and under what conditions bill blocking will occur.  The paper then 
tests the theory with multiple pieces of evidence and statistical analyses from proposed Internet 
intellectual property legislation.  In 1999, the House of Representatives encountered one of the 
most clear-cut instances of jurisdictional uncertainty and encroachment with H.R. 353 and H.R. 
1858 covering database copyright protection.  With hundreds of interest groups acting on each 
side of the issue, and legislators balancing jurisdictional issues against policy outcomes, the fight 
between the two bills typifies how jurisdictional battles play out in Congress. 
This paper has a number of findings.  First, it shows that committees and legislators 
balance the benefits from policy outcomes with the benefits and costs associated with 
challenging jurisdiction over a policy domain.  Seeking jurisdiction is not a cost-free exercise, 
and legislators may be willing to accept a sub-optimal policy in order to obtain future jurisdiction 
over an agenda.  This is not considered in other models of committee power.  Second, the paper 
shows those with the highest incentive to challenge an incumbent jurisdiction will be senior 
members, and members who are in safe districts for whom jurisdiction and the political rents that 
come with it is most valuable.  These results stand in contrast to the current empirical literature, 
which assumes monopoly committee jurisdictions.  Finally, policy proposals and outcomes can 
be greatly affected by the possibility of a challenging committee arising.  In particular, the mere 
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threat to introduce a challenger bill can serve to moderate the content of the incumbent’s 
proposal.  This is important because it suggests that in many areas, policy outcomes may be the 
result of an equilibrium strategy that the incumbent committee plays in order to keep out 
potential challenger committees.  In some cases, the addition of a new gatekeeper to the process 
can result in bill-blocking, and thus kill all proposals.  Overall, introducing jurisdictional conflict 
serves to create more moderate policy positions, and perpetuate the status quo, than would occur 
in the standard committee power model. 
 In the next section, the Internet database protection legislative fight that occurred in the 
106th Congress is described.  Section III provides the outline of a simple theoretical model that 
explicates the behavior when two competing bills are introduced.  This section generates five 
testable implications.  Section IV tests each of the hypotheses using descriptive and statistical 
evidence.  Section V explores extensions to the basic model and alternative explanations.  
Section VI concludes. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
A.  INTERNET DATABASE PROTECTION 
In January 1999, Howard Coble (R-NC) introduced (for a second time), his bill (H.R. 
353) to strengthen Internet intellectual property protection.4  A group of companies and interest 
groups, led by eBay, the Realtors Association, and Reed Elsiver, had been pressing Congress to 
act.  The rise of the Internet made it particularly easy for pirates to extract and replicate on-line, 
electronic, and Internet databases.  This group of firms argued current copyright protection was 
insufficient in balancing the incentives to accumulate and invest in these databases, with the need 
                                                 
4 Much of this section relies on interviews and Baron (2000a). 
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to protect to the free flow of information.  Indeed, many of these companies had become subject 
to “attack” from “pirates.”   
For example, Bidder’s Edge, a rival to eBay, had built its business model upon auction 
aggregation.  The company designed algorithms to search across 120 online auction sites, and 
then download the information of these target auction sites onto its own site.  The “spiders” 
copied and downloaded about 80,000 web pages from eBay onto the Bidder’s Edge site daily.  
eBay estimated that Bidder’s Edge alone accounted for between 1% and 1.5% of the queries 
received by eBay.  This imposed a heavy load eBay’s servers and made its computers operate 
slower for customers accessing the site.  Moreover, eBay could no longer control the experience 
of the consumer once the information was transmitted, and could not control the quality of 
potentially old and stale information.   
Reed Elsiver encountered a similar problem with its Lexis unit.  Lexis provided the full 
text of court cases, regulations, and decisions.  A small start-up Internet company, Jurisline.com, 
purchased the Lexis databases on CD, and copied the CDs to a web server.  It then permitted free 
access to its website containing the legal and regulatory information.   
These “attacker” companies sought legal protection under a 1991 U.S Supreme Court 
decision known popularly as the “Feist” decision (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Company, 499 US 340).  The key question before the Supreme Court was the scope of 
copyright protection.  What in databases could be protected?  The Feist Court ruled, “…all facts-
scientific, historical, biographical and news of the day . . . are part of the public domain available 
to every person.”  They continued: 
“This inevitably means that the copyright in a factual compilation is thin. 
Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use the facts contained 
in another's publication to aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work 
does not feature the same selection and arrangement…Facts, whether alone or as part of a 
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compilation, are not original and therefore may not be copyrighted. A factual compilation is 
eligible for copyright if it features an original selection or arrangement of facts, but the copyright 
is limited to  [*351] the particular selection or arrangement. In no event may copyright extend to 
the facts themselves. …the facts contained in existing works may be freely copied because 
copyright protects only the elements that owe their origin to the compiler -- the selection, 
coordination, and arrangement of facts.” [emphasis added] 
 
 Given that Bidder’s Edge and jurisline.com were using publicly available facts about 
auctions and court cases, it stood to reason, they argued, that the facts in the online databases 
were not protected by copyright, and thus could be copied, provided their selection, coordination, 
and arrangement were not. 
Against this backdrop, these database companies sought a re-write of the copyright law, 
and turned to the chair of the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts and 
Intellectual Property, Howard Coble (R-NC).  eBay, the realtors, and the publishers prevailed 
upon Mr. Coble, in keeping with a long-held Republican belief that property rights should be 
preserved, to introduce a bill to strengthen the copyright protection afforded to electronic and 
online databases.  In January 1999, Rep. Coble introduced a bill into the House of 
Representatives to increase intellectual property protection for electronic databases.  Interest 
groups soon lined up behind the Coble bill, as did 75 co-sponsors.   
 The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act (H.R. 353) introduced by Coble, did not 
copyright facts per se, but it did seek to protect databases and thus overturn Feist.  It made illegal 
for any person to: 
“(a) …make available to others, or extract to make available to others, all or a substantial part of 
a collection of information gathered, organized, or maintained by another person through the 
investment of substantial monetary or other resources, so as to cause material harm to the 
primary market or a related market of that other person, or a successor in interest of that other 
person, for a product or service that incorporates that collection of information and is offered or 
intended to be offered in commerce by that other person, or a successor in interest of that 
person…. 
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(b) …to extract all or a substantial part of a collection of information gathered, organized, or 
maintained by another person” 
 
Any person who was harmed under the terms of the Act could bring a civil court case against the 
alleged infringer, and ask for the profits attributable to the violation, treble actual damages, and a 
fine and/or imprisonment.   
The Act was well received by database producers.  Well-known companies such as 
Monster.com, NASDAQ, and the New York Stock Exchange all supported and lobbied for the 
bill.  A sample list of supporters is provided in Figure 1.  As head of the Intellectual Property 
Subcommittee that had traditionally overseen legislation regarding copyright, Coble was well-
positioned to shepherd his bill through the 106th House of Representatives to a final, and 
expected winning vote in the Republican-majority floor. 
H.R. 353, however, resulted in the organization of a competing interest group coalition of 
old-economy and new economy firms and associations that opposed the bill, spearheaded by 
Yahoo!, NetCoalition (a consortium of ten large Internet companies, including AOL, Amazon),5 
Bloomberg, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the American Research Libraries Association. 
These database users were concerned about how an increase in copyright protection might affect 
their business and their constituents.  A large number of universities, including MIT, Harvard, 
Chicago, and Stanford, (and their associated research libraries) argued if database companies 
were able to compile and copyright the facts from their databases, scientific research of all types 
would be greatly hindered and might even be slowed to a snail’s pace. 
In addition, many Internet companies were concerned that H.R. 353 would create 
“database monopolies,” and thus destroy their business models.  Bloomberg was extremely 
concerned that it would not be able to complete stock price analyses if the Coble bill passed, 
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because the price information would become the domain of the exchanges.   NetCoalition argued 
that the H.R. 353 was too wide ranging, and should be narrowly crafted to meet the needs of a 
specific problem.  Yahoo! was somewhat uniquely positioned to speak on the issue.  It 
maintained its own auction site in competition with eBay and was being scraped and spidered by 
auction aggregators just as eBay.  Unlike eBay, though, it was an aggregator of information as 
well.  Yahoo! vociferously opposed H.R. 353 because it felt the constriction of the flow of 
information would ultimately destroy many of the advantages of the Internet, and create a host of 
unintended consequences.  These groups supported the status quo, or Feist decision, as the 
governing rule over database protection.  However, during the Spring of 1999, they saw their 
support erode.  As a number of people on this side of the issue noted, “We came off as quite 
negative.  It is easier to be ‘for something’, rather than ‘against everything.’”   
Thus, in May 1999, as H.R. 353 was working its way through the Judiciary Committee, 
this coalition persuaded Thomas Bliley (R-VA), chairman of the Commerce Committee, to 
introduce a competing bill into Congress that had the effect of codifying into proposed 
legislation the Feist decision with some small additional protections.  This bill, the Consumer 
and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999 (H.R. 1858) was referred to the Commerce 
Committee, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection. H.R. 1858 
made it: 
“… unlawful for any person or entity…to sell or distribute to the public a database that-- 
          (1) is a duplicate of another database that was collected and organized by another person 
or entity; and 
          (2) is sold or distributed in commerce in competition with that other database” 
 
 Enforcement of the Act rested with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and violators 
of the Act were punished under the rules respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices under 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 eBay was a member of the NetCoalition until late 2000. 
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section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, a much more lenient punishment than H. R. 353 
prescribed.  Supporters of the H.R. 1858 believed that Rep. Bliley, as a relatively powerful 
House member, could insure that the status quo, or an approximate thereof, was retained.   There 
were now two competing bills in Congress in two separate committees.   
 In Figure 2, we outline in a one-dimensional spatial model, the positions of the players.  
Feist (F) was the most lenient possible outcome, offering very low protection to databases.  The 
Judiciary Committee had preferences for very strong protection, which it manifested in the 
introduction of the H.R. 353 (C).  (In later sections of this paper, we discuss why we believe that 
the Coble bill was likely close to the preferences of the Judiciary committee, and this was an 
equilibrium outcome.)  We place C opposite F, but closer to the median voter, M, than F is to the 
median voter.  Thus, an unopposed Coble bill would likely become law.  Finally, the Commerce 
Committee introduced the H.R. 1858 (B), such that it was on the interval [F, C].  We place it to 
the right of Feist, and closer to the median voter than J.  (Again, in the next two sections, we 
discuss why we believe this is an equilibrium outcome.) 
 
B. THE BILL REFERRAL PROCESS 
While the previous section described the bill introduction process in the context of 
database protection, this section describes the bill referral process more generally.  Potential 
legislation in the House is proposed by representatives in the form of bills.  Bills are introduced 
onto the House floor, and then forwarded to the House Parliamentarian who must, within 24 
hours, refer the bill to a House committee for review, modification, or termination.  The House 
Parliamentarian is an appointee of the Speaker of the House and for now is described as an 
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unbiased referrer of bills, referring bills probabilistically on the merits, to committees.  We relax 
this assumption in Section V. 
The bill referral process is made up of two parts:  a codified component and a 
discretionary component.  Rule X of the House Rules allots jurisdiction covering pre-specified 
topics to certain committees.  So, the Financial Services Committee has formal jurisdiction over 
“banks and banking, insurance generally, and international finance,” the Judiciary Committee 
has formal jurisdiction over “patents, the Patent and Trademark Office, copyrights, and 
trademarks,” and the Commerce Committee has formal jurisdiction over “consumer affairs and 
consumer protection, interstate and foreign commerce generally, and regulation of interstate and 
foreign communications.”  Bills that fit squarely into one of the subject areas identified by Rule 
X are then allocated by the Parliamentarian to the committee with formal, codified jurisdiction 
over the issue. 
Many bills, however, may not fit cleanly into the subject areas identified in Rule X.  
Some topics may be at the fringe of the jurisdiction of one committee, other bills may not fit into 
any jurisdiction.  Figure 3 illustrates this with a diagram.  Imagine two committees, 1 and 2, 
which have jurisdiction over some set of issue areas.  The span of issues is represented by the 
box.  There are issues such as A that are at the fringe of one committee’s jurisdiction (such as 
Internet intellectual property protection), there are other issues such as B that reside in no 
committee’s jurisdiction (such as regulation of the accounting industry).  It is in these types of 
cases that the Parliamentarian may exercise discretion in bill referral.   
When there is jurisdictional ambiguity, the Parliamentarian turns to other factors in 
determining the recipient committee for the bill (King 1997).  The first factor is whether the 
current bill amends a public law over which a committee already has jurisdiction.  The second 
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factor is previous bill referral precedents, in a common law sense, to find guidance for the 
current bill.  The third factor is committee expertise in the policy area, evidenced by oversight 
hearings (Talbert et al 1995), the strategic selection of committee staffers, and joining of special 
issue caucuses (King 1997).  The fourth factor is bill titles and preambles and matching these 
subject indicators to committees.  The Parliamentarian takes these factors into account when 
deciding where the “weight of the bill” resides, and which committee should receive the bill.  It 
is for these reasons that legislators adjust their behavior and the language in their bills, to 
enhance the probability that a bill will be referred to their committee.  We model this in the next 
section. 
 
III.  THEORY 
To understand jurisdiction, we start with individual actors.  We assume that legislators’ 
primary goal is be re-elected (Mayhew 1974).  They reach this goal through delivering policy 
favored by constituents and through obtaining political rents, such as campaign contributions and 
information (Peltzman 1976).  Subsets of legislators make up committees.  Any bill proposed by 
a legislator has three components of benefit that help the legislator become re-elected and that 
help the committee gain power.  The first component is the benefit from the policy outcome.  
The second benefit is from legislative jurisdiction.  The third is the benefit from oversight 
jurisdiction.  However, policy creation is not free; it comes at a cost to the legislator.  We 
consider each of these factors below.   
 The first benefit, policy outcomes, has been well-modeled in spatial location models 
(Snyder 1990 and Baron 2000b, for example).  In these models, legislators or committees choose 
policies that are on or close to the ideal points of the median voter in their constituency.  The 
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closer the policy outcome is to the ideal policy of the median voter in the district, the more utility 
the legislator obtains. 
 The second benefit is from legislative jurisdiction.  Legislative jurisdiction is the right of 
a given committee to create, review, modify, and refer legislation on a given issue to the floor of 
the House or Senate.  The codified and common-law processes of obtaining legislative 
jurisdiction are described in the previous section.  There are multiple benefits conveyed through 
legislative jurisdiction.  First, with legislative jurisdiction, committees can craft legislation close 
to their own likings, thus obtaining policy benefits.  Second, committee members have control 
over bills they can use to logroll issues with other committees.  Third, committee members can 
extract information and financial rents from the constituencies they regulate.  The benefit to the 
committee is monotonically increasing in its jurisdiction. 
 A final type of benefit is oversight jurisdiction.  Enacted laws are normally delegated to a 
surrogate for implementation and interpretation.  For example, telecommunications policy is 
frequently delegated to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).  Pollution control 
policy is often delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Intellectual property 
rules are sometimes delegated to the US Patent Office (USPTO), or are sometimes left directly to 
the federal district courts and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.  With each policy that is 
delegated, there is normally a congressional committee that provides oversight of the agency 
charged with implementation.  So the Commerce Committee oversees the FCC, the Resources 
Committee oversees the EPA, and the Judiciary Committee oversees the federal courts.  In most 
cases, the legislative jurisdiction is coupled with the oversight jurisdiction, but this does not 
necessarily have to be the case.  Some industry specific antitrust issues are likely to be referred to 
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both the Commerce and Judiciary Committees, even though only the Department of Justice will 
oversee implementation.6   
 The benefits obtained though this form of jurisdiction can yield both policy and political 
rents.  To the extent that the agency can promulgate regulations affecting industry and interest 
groups, congressional committees with oversight can place pressure (hearings, budgetary) on 
agencies to administratively create policy that might have been difficult to implement within the 
legislative branch.  Moreover, members of such committees can also obtain information and 
financial rents from interest groups that are regulated by the agency the committee oversees. 
 All of these benefits are not cost free to the committees.  In order to engage in policy-
making and jurisdictional policy and oversight, members must exert some amount of effort and 
time, which is related to how much expertise the legislator has in the policy area, and the ease 
with which she has in crafting legislation. 
Committees and legislators are constantly trading off different kinds of benefits.  We can 
characterize the utility functions for the committees as: 
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where itU  is the utility to committee },{, TJii ∈ in period t, *tx  is the equilibrium policy 
generated in period t, )(oF i  is the benefit to oversight jurisdiction, o, )(lGi is the benefit to 
legislative jurisdiction, l, δ is the discount rate, and )(eC i  is the cost, C, of effort, e, committee i 
exerts in writing a bill.   
                                                 
6 For example, antitrust enforcement of entertainment firms is largely left to the Department of Justice. 
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The first term of this utility function is the benefit that the committee obtains from the 
equilibrium policy that will be passed.  Legislators receive positive benefit the closer the policy 
outcome is to their ideal point.  The second term is the discounted benefit obtained by the 
committee from oversight jurisdiction, 0(.) >∂
∂
o
U it .  The third term is the legislative 
jurisdiction a committee has.  Note that the benefits to the two committees are zero-sum—any 
gain in jurisdiction by one committee is a loss by a second committee.  We begin by assuming 
that the incumbent committee, J, has all the jurisdictional power, while the challenger 
committee, T, has none.  This maps into policy A in Figure 3.  Normalizing this, we say that 
0)(,1)( == lGlG TJ  at the outset and create a bound for all time periods such that ]1,0[)( ∈lGi .  
So if the challenger bill is referred to J, there is no change in utility to either committee.  
However, if the challenger bill is referred to T, then J loses utility and T gains that same amount 
of utility, so that 0(.)(.) <∂
∂=∂
∂− l
U
l
U Jt
T
t .  The fourth term is the discounted expected payoff 
to the committee of waiting until the next congress to enact policy, and is a function of the policy 
outcome in the next period and both jurisdictional outcomes. Finally, there is a cost to bill 
introduction, and that is encapsulated in )(eC i , such that the incumbent committee has lower 
marginal cost in writing a bill than the challenger e
eC
e
eC JT ∂∂>∂∂ )()( .  This will induce the 
incumbent committee to introduce bills before the challenger committee will, ceteris paribus. 
The moves of the game are shown in Figure 4.  In the model, an incumbent committee, J, 
proposes a bill that is referred to that committee.  An incumbent committee is the committee that 
would normally have jurisdiction over the issue.  This would be equivalent an issue in the 
position A in Figure 3.  There is a challenger committee, T, which can choose either to introduce 
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a bill at cost, )(eC T , or not introduce a bill.  If there is no bill introduction, then the bill the 
incumbent committee chooses to deliver to the floor that is closer to the median voter, M, than 
the status quo, F, is to M, will become policy.  If the challenger does introduce a bill, there is a 
probability, p, that this bill will be referred by the Parliamentarian to the challenger committee, 
and a probability (1-p) that it will be referred to the incumbent committee.  This probability will 
be pivotal in the behavior of committees.  Again, if the bill is introduced to the incumbent 
committee, the incumbent committee can choose any policy it wishes which is closer to the 
median voter than the status quo.  This will become law because it has agenda-setting power.   
 Once the second bill is referred to the challenger committee, the challenger committee 
has obtained some amount of jurisdictional benefit because the Parliamentarian now recognizes 
T as a legitimate source of legislative jurisdiction over the issue.  Conversely, J loses some 
jurisdictional benefit, because formerly its legislative jurisdiction was unchallenged. 
 With two bills in two committees, there are three possible outcomes.  First, both bills 
could come to the floor and a floor fight would ensue.  Although theoretically this is a 
possibility, the costs to the majority party are very high.  The majority party retains control and 
chairmanship of both committees, thus there would be an intra-party floor fight.  While behind 
closed-doors disagreements are sometimes acceptable to the party leadership, an all-out floor 
fight between committees is viewed as prohibitively costly to the party, except in most extreme 
circumstances (e.g. campaign finance reform).  The reputation capital the party has built with the 
electorate is substantially diminished with floor fights and fights between senior members of the 
same party (committee chairs).  Thus, while theoretically possible, a floor fight has extremely 
high cost to the party and is thus practically disallowed.  The Speaker, through his gatekeeping 
capabilities, will kill both bills. 
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 The second possible outcome is a compromise between the committees.  If a compromise 
cannot be reached, the final outcome will occur—the leadership will kill both bills and the status 
quo will persist until the next year, when there is a possibility to introduce bills again.  Thus,  
jurisdictional conflict is one way in which the Speaker is able to use his ex post gatekeeping 
authority of scheduling bills for floor votes to create compromise. 
 To consider the effects of jurisdictional outcomes on policy, let us consider extreme 
effects of the bill referral process.  Let us assume the probability of a second bill referral to the 
challenger committee, T, is zero (p = 0), in this framework.  In this case, only one bill is 
introduced, C, that is closer to the median voter than F.  This bill goes to committee J and 
becomes law.  This is the underlying assumption of the bill referral process is most of the 
committee-dominance literature and C becomes the equilibrium.  Now let us assume that T 
receives the second bill with p = 1.  First, recognize that that even if no policy passes, T is better 
off and J is worse off, for reasonable bill introduction costs )(eC T .  This is because by merely 
having the second bill referred to T, T gains some legislative jurisdiction over the issue and J 
loses some legislative jurisdiction over the issue.  Second, on the policy-making front, J will 
introduce a bill so as to maximize its expected utility.  In order to do this, J must introduce bill C 
so that T is no worse off than the compromise policy solution plus the expected jurisdictional 
gains it would make (minus the costs of bill introduction) from introducing another bill.  As the 
probability that T receives a second bill increases, J is willing to introduce a bill closer to T’s 
ideal point.  That is, as the threat of a challenger committee encroaching on the policy space 
increases, the more the incumbent committee is willing to attenuate its initial policy position to 
prevent this encroachment.  It can be shown that the equilibrium policy when there is 
jurisdictional conflict will be on the interval [T,F’] where F’ is the same distance from F to T, 
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but positioned on the opposite side of T than is F. This is a form of compromise—offering a 
more moderate policy position to induce no challenge from a potential competitor.  This result is 
quite different from the previous committee dominance literature with static, unambiguous, and 
monopoly committee jurisdiction.  We now generate the first hypothesis. 
 
H1:  The higher the probability a challenger bill will be referred to another committee, the more 
moderate the incumbent committee’s policy position will be to prevent jurisdictional 
encroachment. 
 
 If bill introduction is a cost free exercise, then the expected utility to introducing a bill is 
strictly positive for all members of congress for any p > 0.  This is because even with very, very 
tiny probabilities of a challenger committee receiving a bill referral of a second bill, there is a 
positive payoff to the challenger committee.  However, the cost is not zero.  In fact, different 
committees may have different costs in writing a bill in a given area because of their experience 
and expertise.  Committees that have experience in the focal policy issue or related policy issues 
will have lower costs of formulating policy in the focal area.  That is, it is very expensive for the 
Agriculture Committee to write a bill regarding copyright, but it is less expensive for the 
Commerce Committee.  This leads directly to our second prediction. 
   
H2:  Committees close in expertise to the focal committee are more likely to introduce 
challenger bills. 
 
As Eq (1) and (2) indicate, legislators can engage in trade-offs.  There are two prototypical 
types of models of legislator utility functions.  The first, is a spatial model in policy space, where 
legislators are trying to obtain their highest utility policy outcome.  The second is a jurisdictional 
encroachment model, where legislators are trying to obtain the most legislative and oversight 
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jurisdiction feasible.  In this paper, we consider that both factors are important, and legislators 
will be willing to trade one for the other.  For example, if the Judiciary Committee introduces a 
bill that is right on the ideal point of the Commerce Committee, the Commerce Committee 
members may still introduce a competing bill, similar to the Judiciary Committee bill, to obtain 
jurisdictional benefits.  Indeed, there are instances that might arise when a challenger committee 
may introduce a bill that is far from its ideal point if it believes that the positioning of the bill 
will enhance its ability to obtain jurisdiction.  It depends fundamentally upon how the challenger 
committee weights the policy outcome with the costs and benefits from legislative and oversight 
jurisdiction.  This is not considered in previous models of committee dominance.  We state this 
in the third hypothesis. 
 
H3:  If legislative and oversight jurisdiction is highly enough valued by the challenger 
committee, the challenger committee will introduce policy that is not close to its idea point to 
gain jurisdiction.  
 
 Not only will different committees have different incentives to act, so too will different 
members of those committees.  Two characteristics to jurisdiction lead to prediction.  The first, 
as King (1997) notes, legislative jurisdiction takes time to build, through multiple bill referrals in 
many congresses.  Oversight jurisdiction takes to time to implement as well (Weingast and 
Moran 1983).  Thus, individuals who value jurisdiction relatively more than those who value 
policy will be those legislators who expect to be in congress when they are able to realize the 
benefits.  That is, individuals who are in safe seats are more likely to value jurisdiction, which 
comes to fruition in the longer-term, than those in marginal seats, who will be more concerned 
about immediate policy outcomes that enhance re-election chances in the next election.  Second, 
jurisdiction will be more important to those most able to use the jurisdiction ceded to them. 
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These are likely to be the senior members of the committee in the second, third, and fourth 
positions, who will become chairmen themselves. These considerations are not taken into 
account in the previous models of bill sponsorship.  We state this in the next hypothesis: 
 
H4:  Senior members and members in safe seats in the challenger committee are most likely to 
sponsor challenger bills.   
 
In a one period game (without expectations), there will always be compromise, enforced 
by the Speaker’s gatekeeping power.   The last term of the utility function, however, expresses 
each committees’ expectation of outcomes in the next period.  If there is full information of these 
expectations in the next period, compromise is still reached.   This is because both committees 
know the expectations about the outcome of the legislative game in the next period, and can 
factor this into the compromise they frame in this period.  However, if there is uncertainty, and 
information is private, then compromise may be elusive.  Assume each committee makes a 
private, unbiased assessment of its future prospects in the next congress, with some error, ε ~ 
N(0, σ2).  If both sides have negative errors (private pessimistic draws about their prospects for 
the next period) then there will be more room for compromise in the current period.  If both sides 
have positive errors (private optimism about their possibilities in the next period), then there will 
be no compromise and both bills will die.  If one side is optimistic and one side is pessimistic, 
then it is the relative optimism and pessimism that will matter.  We state this in our final 
hypothesis. 
 
H5:  Conditional on the challenger bill being referred to the challenger committee, there will be a 
compromise equilibrium, provided a) both parties are not idiosyncratically optimistic about their 
possibilities in the next Congress or, b) the relative optimism of one party does not exceed the 
relative pessimism of the second party. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In this section, we empirically examine the predictions of the committee jurisdiction 
model on legislator and committee behavior, and policy outcomes.  We test each of the five 
hypothesis posed in the theory section by examining Internet legislation and focussing on the 
copyright fight that occurred between the two committees. 
 
A. EXAMINING HYPOTHESIS 1  
In order to examine Hypothesis 1, we must establish the incumbent committee was the 
Judiciary Committee, and we must examine the probability that the Judiciary Committee would 
be challenged by another committee over copyright protection.  If the probability is high, then, in 
equilibrium, the Judiciary Committee should introduce a moderate bill, somewhat close to the 
preferences of the competing committee, to stave off a jurisdictional challenge.  If the probability 
is low that a challenger committee will arise, then the bill introduced by the Judiciary Committee 
can more closely reflect the preferences of the committee, and thus be more extreme.  In this 
section, we establish three arguments: the Judiciary Committee was the incumbent committee, 
H.R. 353 likely reflected the sincere preferences of the Judiciary Committee, and the probability 
of a challenger committee arising was small. 
There are three main factors that suggest the Judiciary Committee was the incumbent 
committee, and that it was likely to receive H.R. 353.  First, Representative Coble had a long-
expressed interest in the bill.  This was not the first time a nearly-identical version of this same 
bill had gone through the House.  The earlier bill was also referred to the Judiciary Committee in 
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the 105th Congress, giving precedent for this bill to follow the same committee referral path.7  
Second, Coble’s staff, with the help of similarly-minded interest groups, had written the H.R. 
353.  King (1997) notes that bills are written with language so as to route the bill to certain 
committees.  Coble in essence wrote a bill that had a high probability of being referred to his 
committee, and eventually his subcommittee.  Finally, the Judiciary Committee had set a long-
established precedent of handling bills covering copyright.  Table 1 examines all legislative 
hearings covering proposed copyright bills in the 80th through 103rd congresses (1946-1994)8.  
During this nearly 50-year period, the Judiciary Committee received 86% (127) of referrals.  We 
can assume that this was the lowest probability that the Coble bill would have been referred to 
the Judiciary committee.9  That probability was enhanced by the previous bill history, and by the 
fact that Coble, and interest groups allied with him, had written the bill.   
To establish sincerity of the preferences, we turn to two main arguments.  First, the 
current bill was almost identical to the bill introduced into the previous Congress, when there 
was no jurisdictional challenge.  Second, H.R. 353 reflected the consistent behavior and rhetoric 
of the Judiciary Committee of strong intellectual property rights.  Although the Coble bill had the 
support of the median voter (the voice vote in the previous Congress is an indicator of the 
capturing of the median voter) it was far stronger than the Feist decision.  Thus, we map the 
policy supported by Judiciary, C, to the right of the median voter in Figure 2. 
 Finally, if the position of H.R. 353 is to be an equilibrium policy choice for the Judiciary 
Committee, then we must assess the probability (p) that nature would refer a challenger bill to a 
                                                 
7 In this Congress, Howard Coble attached his bill as an amendment to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA).  The actual vote on the amendment was a voice vote.  Senator Orin Hatch eventually demanded that this 
provision be retracted from the Senate version, and the DMCA passed without the Coble Amendment.   
8 Center for American Politics, University of Washington.- 
9 We contrast this to more stable issues areas, such as agriculture, which has an 86% to 90% probability of bill 
referral to the Agriculture Committee. 
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second committee for consideration.  If p is high, then Coble should have introduced a bill that 
was moderate; if p is low the bill can mirror J’s preferences in equilibrium.  As noted in Table 1, 
14% of legislative hearings on copyright bills were sent to another committee.  Thus, there was 
an unconditional probability of 14% that another committee might get a second bill.  The 
Science, Space and Technology Committee (under various names) received the second most 
number of copyright bill referrals at 5% (8) during 1946-1994, and posed perhaps the greatest 
threat for a competing bill.  However, Representative James Sessenbrenner (R-Wis), Chairman 
of the Science, Space, and Technology Committee, was in line to ascend to the chair of the 
Judiciary Committee, and did not want to upset the possibility of this coming to fruition in the 
next congress.  He was thus reticent to introduce a bill competing with the Judiciary Committee’s 
bill.10  With the Science Committee unlikely to introduce a bill, the base probability that Coble 
faced was about p = 9% that another committee would introduce a competing bill. 11  Thus, in 
this analysis, the behavior of the Judiciary Committee in introducing a somewhat extreme bill 
seems reasonable.12  In this sense, the behavior of the Judiciary Committee was consistent with 
Hypotheses 1.  It is important to establish Hypothesis 1, because Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 are 
observable only in disequilibrium, which occurs in this setting.13 
 
 
                                                 
10 In all likelihood, he opposed the introduction of H.R. 1858, because this would diminish the jurisdictional clout 
that the Judiciary Committee maintained over copyright. 
11 King has pointed out that in reality, the true probabilities are probably much lower than reflected in this paper, but 
highly correlated with the estimated probabilities. 
12 Although we are examining 50-year mean probabilities, we can also review shifts in probability over time. Table 
1 shows that other than the Science Committee, no other committee had systematically increased their legislative 
referrals in copyright issues over the past 10 congresses.  Thus, had any member of Congress introduced a bill 
covering copyright law, it would likely have been referred to the Judiciary Committee.   
13 That is, it is the case that if the Judiciary Committee believes that there will be a competing bill, it will introduce a 
more moderate position in the first instance, thus making competing bill introduction too costly for the potential 
benefit, and thus unobservable. 
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B.  EXAMINING HYPOTHESIS 2 
In this section, we consider which committees had the lowest effort in crafting a 
challenger bill, and how committees go about lowering the cost of challenging.  The incentive 
for a member from a competing committee to introduce a bill is both policy and jurisdictionally 
oriented.  Table 1 indicates that only a handful of committees, other than Science, had any 
expertise in drafting copyright bills (the Commerce Committee included).  Although they had 
minimal expertise in copyright, the Commerce Committee was aggressively attempting to 
expand its jurisdiction over issues covering the Internet.14  In framing the copyright bill in 
another dimension—an Internet bill—the Commerce Committee members not only did craft a 
bill in an area in which they had expertise, but also enhanced the probability of bill referral to 
their committee.  Creating this added dimension or framing to the issue enhanced Commerce 
Committee claims to the issue. 
The jurisdictional “turf war” over the Internet had proceeded with some vigor during the 
106th Congress.  Table 2 illustrates all the main bills that were introduced in the 106th Congress 
covering the Internet.  Commerce was attempting to expand its jurisdiction in Internet issues, so 
it could obtain the political rents related to the “digital economy.”  The success of Commerce in 
this new issue area is evidenced by its reception of primarily referrals on over 63% of these bills 
(21 of 33).  In reframing the copyright issue as an Internet issue, the Commerce Committee had 
not only an incentive to introduce a competing bill, but it also had lower effort than other 
committees in crafting a bill in this area.  Although ex ante Coble’s strategy seemed sensible in 
crafting an extreme bill as a copyright bill, the Bliley strategy framing the competing bill as an 
                                                 
14 By the time the 107th Congress convened, the Commerce Committee had changed the name of the Subcommittee 
on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection to the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the 
Internet.  The Judiciary Committee changed the name of the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property to 
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Internet bill not only lower the effort of the bill’s crafters, but also ex post increased the 
probability of bill referral to the Commerce Committee where the ex ante probability (as a 
copyright bill) would have been low.  These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2 that the 
Commerce Committee had built up expertise in the area of Internet regulation, and was thus most 
likely to have low effort in introducing a competing bill.   
Table 2 also provides additional evidence of the broader jurisdictional struggle between 
the two committees in Internet issues.  Although 70% of bill referrals were to the bill sponsors’ 
committee, there is still strong evidence of jurisdictional fights.  Sixteen bills were introduced by 
Commerce Committee members, and twenty-three were referred to that committee.  Eight were 
introduced by Judiciary Committee members, and twelve were referred to that committee. While 
the struggle to regulate the Internet occurred between Judiciary and Commerce, the 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee attempted to enter the fray (framing the Internet as 
an “infrastructure” issue), but was unsuccessful.  Though members from this committee 
introduced five bills, their committee was referred only one bill.  Moreover, on specific issues, 
there are winners and losers.  For example, H.R. 313, on consumer privacy, clearly affected the 
banking industry in a serious way regarding financial transactions and disclosure.  Rep. Vento, a 
member of the banking committee introduced the bill, but his committee received no oversight or 
reporting authority; instead the bill was referred to the Commerce Committee.   
 
C.  EXAMINING HYPOTHESIS 3 
The third hypothesis predicts that challenger committees may not support bills in their 
best policy interest, if they believe that such a position will increase the committee’s legislative 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property.  This is consistent with King (1997) arguing that 
subcommittee names reflect current and desired jurisdictions. 
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and oversight jurisdictional scope.  While the theory in Section III does not exclude the 
possibility that bills will be introduced by challengers with policy positions they support, there 
are few theories that predict that bills that are not in the policy interests of the committee will be 
introduced.   
To test this hypothesis, we examine bill co-sponsorship and its relationship to turf wars 
using multivariate statistical analysis focusing on the policy-jurisdiction trade-off.15  As noted in 
Section II, the oversight of the implementation of database copyright bills was to be delegated to 
the courts in H.R. 353 and to the FTC in H.R. 1858.   Hence, Coble and Bliley delegated 
implementation of their respective bills to agencies for which they had oversight.   
If Hypothesis 3 has credibility, we should see the sponsors H.R. 353 bill acting out their 
relatively sincere constituent preferences.  They have an ex ante belief that there is a low 
likelihood of a challenge to the Coble bill, thus the jurisdictional benefits are moot to them.  (The 
second and third term of J’s utility function is not changed.)  However, supporters of H.R. 1858 
could be responsive to their constituents, or to jurisdictional issues at hand.  If we find the former 
(constituency responsiveness), this is consistent with a host of different theories.  However, if we 
do not find the former, and find only the latter (jurisdictional responsiveness), this is consistent 
only with the theory of committee jurisdictional conflict. 
We begin by considering as our dependent variable whether a legislator co-sponsored 
H.R. 353 (1) or not (0).  In a second set of specifications, we consider whether a legislator co-
sponsored H.R. 1858 (1) or not (0).   
We consider four types of independent variables.  All the variable definitions are 
summarized in Table 3.  The first variable measures the amount of educational employment in 
                                                 
15 For papers on patterns of co-sponsorship, see Gilligan and Krehbiel (1997), Kessler and Krehbiel (1996), and 
Krehbiel (1995). 
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the legislator’s district.  Recall that the only cleanly identifiable industry sector that was 
uniformly opposed to H.R. 353, and supported H.R. 1858, were universities.  Nearly 100 
universities publicly expressed opposition to H.R. 353 and support of H.R. 1858.  Thus 
educational employment should be correlated with constituent preferences.  The second set of 
variables is the committee assignments of the legislators, to control for jurisdictional disputes.  
Dummy variables for membership on the House Commerce Committee, Judiciary Committee, 
and Science Committee are coded.  The third variable measures the ADA score of the 
representative, as a proxy for the ideology of legislator.  Finally, a number of control variables 
for the representative’s district are coded.  These include the median income in the district, the 
median housing value in the district (as a measure of wealth), and the number of individuals with 
college degrees.  All district characteristics are drawn from Census data. 
The predictions of the theory are threefold, and relatively stringent.  First, to the extent 
that the incumbent committee believes it is acting unchallenged, the bill it proposes should 
reflect the true policy concerns of its sponsors’ constituents.  Therefore, we should find the 
coefficients on educational employment to be negative and statistically significant for the H.R. 
353 regressions.  Second, if the challenging (Commerce) committee is seeking jurisdiction, and 
not actual policy, they should not be voting with their constituents.  So the coefficients for on 
educational employment for H.R. 1858 should not be statistically significant.  Finally, 
jurisdictional conflict between committees should be manifested by committee memberships, 
with committee members splitting to support their own bills.  Thus, in the H.R. 353 regression, 
there should be a positive coefficient on the Judiciary Committee variable and a negative 
coefficient on the Commerce Committee variable.  The opposite should be true of the H.R. 1858 
regressions. All three of these predictions together are consistent with the various predictions of 
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hypothesis three, and the latter two would be inconsistent with previous models of committee 
dominance. 
We present the results of a probit analysis in Table 4.  In all statistical models in this 
paper, the coefficients report the change in the probability of the dependent variable for an 
infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, the discrete 
change in the probability for dummy variables.  The two-sided t-statistics are presented below 
the coefficient estimates, with the 95%, and 99% significance level noted for each coefficient.   
Models (1) and (2) use H.R. 353 as the dependent variable; Models (3) and (4) use H.R. 1858 as 
the dependent variable.  Models (1) and (3) contain only the constituency and ideology variables; 
Models (2) and (4) include the committee assignment variables.  H.R. 353 was cosponsored by 
17% of the members of Congress, while H.R. 1858 had only 4% of the congress supporting his 
bill.   
Models (1) and (2) show that the coefficient on educational sector employment variable 
is negative and statistically significant as predicted.  In no specification is the coefficient on 
ADA score or any other control variables statistically significant.  The large negative coefficient 
on educational employment for Models (1) and (2) is consistent with H.R. 353 co-sponsors 
voting with the preferences of the constituents.  Every 10,000-person (about 1.5%) increase in 
educational employment (about the employment from a medium-sized university in the district) 
makes a legislator 7.7% less likely to sponsor H.R. 353.  This is consistent with the first 
prediction.  In Models (3) and (4), the coefficients on educational employment is not statistically 
different from zero.  This is consistent with H.R. 1858 supporters not sincerely voting with their 
constituents’ interests.  This is consistent with the second prediction.   
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Finally, the four coefficients on the Judiciary and Commerce Committee membership 
variables are all large in magnitude, signed as predicted, and three of the four are statistically 
significant.  Science Committee members show no discernible higher or lower cosponsorship 
tendencies for each bill than other members of the House.  A Commerce Committee member is 
10.1% less likely to cosponsor H.R. 353 than the average House member, and 23.4% more likely 
to cosponsor H.R. 1858 than the average member.  A Judiciary Committee member is 33.5% 
more likely to cosponsor H.R. 353 and 1.1% less likely to the cosponsor H.R. 1858 than the 
average House member.  This last coefficient on Judiciary Committee is negative as expected, 
but does not reach statistical significance.  Rep. Rick Boucher, who sits on both the Commerce 
and Judiciary Committees, was the only Judiciary Committee member to co-sponsor the Bliley 
bill.  The small number of sponsors (18) likely drives the lack of statistical significance on this 
coefficient.  Other than this perturbation, all coefficients come out as expected.  This last result 
on committee membership is consistent with the third prediction finding indications of 
jurisdictional fights between committees.  Together, these three results suggest that turf wars are 
important, and that the incumbents, not expecting a challenge, acted more sincerely than the 
challengers did in the policy domain.   
 
D.  EXAMINING HYPOTHESIS 4 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that individual actors will also have preferences over bill 
introduction.  It predicts that senior members and members in safe seats of the challenging 
committee will have the greatest incentive to exert effort in mounting a jurisdictional challenge.  
The legislators who gain the most from added jurisdiction and are those most likely to survive in 
the next election from not sincerely representing their constituents’ interest on any given issue.  
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The latter point could be thought of as those legislators in competitive seats having very high 
discount rates. 
To test this hypothesis, we conduct an econometric analysis of the cosponsorship 
behavior of members of the challenging committee.  We consider who from the Commerce 
Committee (n = 53) cosponsored the H.R. 1858, the challenging bill, using as our dependent 
variable whether a member of the Commerce Committee cosponsored the H.R. 1858 (1) or not 
(0).  The independent variables are as before, but this time we include two additional variables:  
Committee Rank as a measure of Commerce Committee seniority, and Election Margin, as a 
measure of how safe the member is in her seat.  We predict that the coefficient on Committee 
Rank should be negative (more senior members are more likely to support challenging bills) and 
the coefficient on Election Margin should be positive (members with higher margins of victory 
in the last election are more likely to support challenging bills). 
The results of the probit analysis are presented in Model (5) of Table 5.  Congruent with 
our earlier findings, legislator ideology, educational employment, and the control variables do 
not have statistically significant coefficients.  There is, however, a statistically significant 
relationship between the two variables of theoretical interest, and the dependent variable.  More 
senior members of the Commerce Committee are more likely to support the H.R. 1858 than are 
their junior counterparts, and legislators with larger margins in the last election are more likely to 
support the H.R. 1858.  Each step up on the committee makes an individual 2.5% more likely to 
sponsor the H.R. 1858.  Each 2,200 increase in vote margin increases the probability of support 
of the H.R. 1858 by 1%.16   
                                                 
16 A similar analysis done on Judiciary Committee H.R. 353 cosponsors finds that neither of these variables have a 
statistically significant effect.  This is consistent with the theory, because only challenger committees stand to gain 
jurisdiction from these jurisdictional challenges. 
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These results stand in contrast to Krehbiel (1995), in his examination of budget co-
sponsorship, which shows that electoral margins make no difference in bill co-sponsorship, while 
more junior members of committees were more likely to co-sponsor bills.  One key factor that 
differentiates Krehbiel’s work from this study is that there is no jurisdictional conflict in 
Krehbiel’s budget vote.  Indeed, it may be that precisely because there is jurisdictional conflict, 
the current paper obtains results that are the opposite that Krehbiel has.  Junior members get little 
benefit from jurisdiction (as in this paper), but may get lots of benefit from high profile co-
sponsorship on budgeting issues (as in Krehbiel’s paper).  Likewise, those is safe districts can 
trade policy for jurisdiction (as in this paper), but there is no trade to occur when there is no 
jurisdiction at stake (as in Krehbiel’s paper).17 
 
E.  EXAMINING HYPOTHESIS 5 
With H.R. 353 in the Judiciary Committee, and H.R. 1858 in the Commerce Committee, 
the game proceeded to the final stage of three options:  kill both bills, compromise on a single 
bill, or engage in a floor fight where the “best bill” would win.   
The first option, a floor fight, is institutionally possible in the House.  In fact, the two 
sides considered such a proposition.  One H.R. 353 supporter noted: 
 
 “We were ready to have a floor fight over this issue.  However, the leadership of the 
House was not willing to have a floor fight.  There would be too much blood.  They were going 
to kill both bills if we couldn’t get a compromise.”   
 
For the same reasons elucidated in Section III, the floor fight alternative was eliminated (or 
dominated by other strategies) through the gatekeeping power of the Speaker. 
                                                 
17 Schiller (1995) also finds no election margin effect.   
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This floor fight eliminated as a strategy, the two sides attempted compromise.  A series of 
meetings were held with Bliley and Coble staffers, and the interest groups involved.  For a 
number of months, both sides attempted to craft a compromise agreement, but none could be 
found.  Thus, the Speaker refused to bring either bill to the floor for a vote, and both were killed. 
Why was neither committee willing to compromise?  The reason lies in the comparative 
payoffs between compromise and killing the bill.  The interest groups supporting Bliley offered 
H.R. 1858 to block H.R. 353 from becoming law.  That is, they were attempting to force a 
satisfactory compromise between committees that they had been denied within the Judiciary 
Committee.  Had compromise been reached within the Judiciary Committee, this jurisdictional 
fight would not have occurred.  Moreover, in the long term, H.R. 1858 supporters believed that 
their coalition would expand, and they would continue to win future fights.  In addition, with the 
change in Judiciary Committee chairmanship in the next Congress from Hyde to Sessenbrenner 
(at the time the subcommittee chairmanship was unclear, though a year later it turned out to be 
Hyde), advocates of the low intellectual property protection position believed Sessenbrenner 
would pressure the subcommittee chair to offer a much more moderate position.  Sessenbrenner 
had been sympathetic to the university community as Chairman of the Science Committee in the 
past.  The Commerce Committee had already succeeded in claiming some legislative jurisdiction 
over copyright issues, and H.R. 1858 supporters believed that, in the worst case, they could again 
have the Commerce Committee claim jurisdiction, and thus block, any unsuitable compromise 
position.  Hence, the current and future payoffs to compromise seemed lower than those of 
having the bills jointly killed for the H.R.1858 coalition. 
For the H.R. 353 coalition, the final calculus was also intertemporal.  Though they were 
willing to compromise with the supporters of H.R. 1858, they were unwilling to move 
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sufficiently close to engender unified support for a compromise bill.  A bill similar to H.R. 353 
had been approved by the House floor in the previous session of congress.  Although it was 
facing a challenge in the current session of congress, H.R. 353 was likely to pass in the next 
congress, they professed amongst themselves.  Billy Tauzin (R-LA) (who was to take over for 
Bliley as Commerce Committee chair) would be more sympathetic to their interests.  Finally, 
H.R. 353 supporters believed as the Internet evolved and stabilized, more members of Congress 
would see the logic of their approach.  That is, the preferences of the median voter would shift in 
their favor.  H.R. 353 forces were willing to let status quo prevail this year, and attempt to pass 
their bill again next year attempt again.  Compromise today for the H.R. 353 supporters had a 
lower payoff than having both bills killed. 
Thus, compromise was not reached in the 106th Congress, and instead, both bills were 
killed in the Rules Committee by the House leadership.  Both sides were optimistic about their 
chances in the next Congress, and this resulted in the equilibrium that neither side accepted 
compromise.  Thus, even though either bill would likely have made the median voter of the 
House floor better off than Feist, both bills died.  This final result is consistent with Hypothesis 5 
on relative optimism. 
 
V. EXTENSIONS AND ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
In the previous section, we provide evidence consistent with the theory.  In this section, 
we consider three alternative explanations or extensions to the theory presented:  the role of the 
Parliamentarian as an agent of the Speaker of the House, the role of uncertainty and information 
in jurisdictional disputes, and the role of interest groups in affecting the utility function of 
legislators and committees. 
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A.   THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE AND BILL REFERRAL 
 One concern with the theory is that the Parliamentarian is modeled as a nonpartisan, 
unbiased allocator of bills.  As an appointee of the The Speaker of the House, one might expect 
that the Speaker will exert ex ante control over the bill referral process, through his agent (the 
Parliamentarian).  The Speaker may have preferences over target committees for particular bills 
and wish to mold the nature and policy outcomes of jurisdictional battles, and thus exert his 
discretion through the Parliamentarian.   
There is a large amount of evidence, however, this is not the case.  King (1997: Chapter 
4), in perhaps the most detailed and cited analysis of congressional parliamentarians, has argued 
strongly that the Parliamentarian, while serving at the pleasure of the Speaker, has wide 
discretion, exclusive of the Speaker, in determining which committees receive which bills.  King 
points out that between 1928 and 1994, there were 13 different speakers of the House, but only 
two head parliamentarians (p. 78).  When Newt Gingrich (R-GA) became Speaker in 1995 (after 
the ouster of Thomas Foley (D-WA)), he fired all employees under his remit (including the 
nonpartisan House Historian and the Head of Food Services), but retained the Parliamentarian.  
Speaker after speaker has been bombarded with requests to remove the parliamentarian for 
political reasons, only to stand behind the nonpartisanship of the speaker.  Additionally, King 
documents in extensive interviews with both Democrats and Republicans, that the 
Parliamentarian is essentially the last nonpartisan member of the Congress. 18  CQ Weekly 
                                                 
18 King notes that one minority staffer on the Rules Committee who regularly interacts with Parliamentarians said 
that “sometimes you get a little hint [the Parliamentarian is] being reined by the speaker, but not on bill referrals.  
They’re straight about that.”  Another noted, “Even the parliamentarians have to be careful, frankly, that they don’t 
piss off the leadership too much by giving advice that’s totally contrary to where the leadership wants to go.  There 
is some politics mixed in, but they would never admit to it.  But if you want to know, does anyone tell the 
parliamentarians what to do or how to refer bills?  Absolutely not.  No.” (p. 84)   
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Report noted, “….[the House Parliamentarian] maintains a tradition of nonpartisanship in the 
post.”  In addition, the 30 years of apprenticeship required to understand the complex rules of 
procedures make the Parliamentarian difficult to replace.  
This strong form argument of nonpartisanship of the Parliamentarian does not preclude 
the Speaker from influencing jurisdictional disputes.  The Speaker, in determining which bills 
come to the floor from committees, can control the agenda setting process ex post, as modeled in 
Section III.  Alternatively, the Speaker can encourage (and perhaps offer resources to) 
committees to introduce bills competing with ones he does not prefer.  In this way, the Speaker 
can create jurisdictional conflict, and then strengthen his hand at killing the original bill (and the 
competing bill) through the ex post, agenda-setting mechanisms.   
 
B.  UNCERTAINTY, INFORMATION, and THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE 
A second concern is that despite this detailed and well-evidenced argument by King, it 
may be the case that King is incorrect, and the Speaker can control the bill referral process.  We 
may not observe Speaker intervention with parliamentarians because parliamentarians are 
compliant to the Speaker’s wishes in equilibrium.    
In a complete information model of Speaker ex ante bill referral control, the Speaker 
refers bills only to those committees with preferences close to his own.  Through the use of ex 
ante control, the Speaker can micromanage the process of bill introduction and referral (and thus 
policy outcomes), by insuring that all bills go to the committee that has similar ideology to his 
own.  In doing this, there will be no jurisdictional conflict, because all bills will go to the 
committee of congruent ideology with the Speaker, and this committee will generate a policy 
which is close to the Speaker’s ideal point.  Members, anticipating this outcome, will not 
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introduce competing bills, in equilibrium.  We do see jurisdictional conflict in practice, so this 
model must not be correct. 
A more interesting reason for ex ante control, however, is that the Speaker may be 
splitting jurisdiction for informational reasons in a model of incomplete information.19  The 
Speaker, when faced with a new issue, may not know what outcome is congruent with his 
preferences.  Thus, the Speaker creates jurisdictional conflict between committees of differing 
ideologies so that they generate information for the Speaker to assess the optimal bill structure.  
Committees with differing ideologies (e.g. liberals and conservatives) are each encouraged to 
introduce competing bills on a given topic.  The return to a given committee to exerting effort in 
bill introduction is twofold: a) jurisdictional claims, and b) ideological policy claims if they win.20   
In order to econometrically test this hypothesis, one would need a detailed analysis of 
preferences on a variety of bills and issues.  This is well beyond the scope of this paper.  
However, we introduce three different reasons that while this story may be possible, it is not 
likely.  First, other tools available to the Speaker can generate this same result at lower cost to 
the committees and speaker.  The Speaker can refer a given bill contemporaneously to two or 
more different committees, or sequentially to one committee and then to another committee.  
Each committee has the power to modify the bill in the committee to its liking, thus generating 
information for the Speaker, without having to engage in a complete, and more costly, writing of 
a new bill.  Sequential referral and multiple referral mechanisms, at the discretion of the 
Parliamentarian, can generate the result without any “strategic” behavior by committees. 
A second, more case-specific, reason that it is unlikely the Speaker created ex ante 
jurisdictional conflict for this particular issue is that the bill was previously introduce onto, and 
                                                 
19 See Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) for an example. 
20 This is akin to side payments as in Snyder (1991). 
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passed, the House Floor as an amendment to the DMCA.  Therefore, in order for the Speaker to 
create jurisdictional conflict for informational reasons in this case, there would have to be new 
information in the previous 12 months that the Speaker sought. 
Third, we can examine the data to see if informational reasons drove the Speaker to 
create jurisdictional conflict to obtain information.  If the Speaker wishes to obtain maximum 
information, he should maximize the variance of information he obtains.  In doing this, he lowers 
the probability of obtaining identical information from two like-minded committees.  He 
therefore should allocate jurisdiction to committees with demonstrated differing ideologies on 
the issue.  That is, the Speaker should refer competing bills to committees that are opposed (or 
on the opposite ends of the spectrum) to the Judiciary Committee.   
To explore this point, we examined all bills that referenced the Internet, Digital 
Technology, or Copyright, that were introduced into the second session of the 105th Congress 
and the first session of the 106th Congress, before the referral of H.R. 1858 to the Commerce 
Committee.  Although there were numerous bills, three bills were brought up for a total of four 
votes that were not unanimous.  In all four votes, all the members of the Commerce Committee 
voted with all the members of the Judiciary Committee.  The legislators who voted against this 
group were predominantly from the Armed Services, Banking, Education, Resources, and 
International Relations Committees.  If a Speaker was attempting to expand the scope of the 
information draw, it seems he would refer competing bills to these committees to generate 
maximum information, rather than the more like-minded Commerce Committee. 
While the foregoing discussion does not exclude the possibility that the Speaker creates 
jurisdictional overlap for informational reasons, it suggests that competing bill introduction is an 
expensive way of doing this.  Moreover, the data do not support the argument that the Speaker 
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maximizes information in this case.  Rather, the Speaker has more control and lower costs in 
using multiple referrals or sequential referrals to generate the same outcome. 
 
C.  INTEREST GROUPS 
A final concern about the theory is that interest groups are not formally modeled.  This, 
however, can easily be incorporated into the model.  Interest groups serve two main purposes in 
the model.  First, they serve a fire alarm function (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).  They troll 
the landscape and alert competing committees about jurisdictional “mistakes” made by 
incumbent committees.  When there is an opportunity for an interest-group-friendly committee to 
claim some jurisdiction over the issue, interest groups alert the potentially competing committee.  
In this sense, they notify competing committees of the probability, p, in the model.  Second, 
interest groups are quite instrumental in bill creation.  By writing sections of bills, interest groups 
can lower the cost, C(e), to the competing committee of challenging jurisdiction. 
 In Internet intellectual property protection, interest groups were active in creating 
jurisdictional conflict.  The universities and groups which opposed H.R. 353 were quite active in 
seeking out competing committees (p), and affected the cost of bill introduction for Commerce 
Committee, C(e),  through crafting sections of a competing bill. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Jurisdictional conflict between committees within Congress is common and increasing 
(Baumgartner et al 2000). The theory developed in this paper extends upon a small but important 
body of literature examining congressional committee jurisdiction.  The theory demonstrates that 
actors with foresight can have large impacts on policy outcomes by merely threatening to engage 
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in jurisdictional turf wars.  Moreover, legislators and committees will engage in jurisdictional 
turf wars even if it means introducing sub-optimal legislation from the sponsor’s viewpoint.  
This is because the gains from obtaining a slice of legislative or oversight jurisdiction over an 
issue may result in a greater gain to utility than the loss of the policy position.   
The theoretical results in this paper stand in contrast to the vast literature on committee 
dominance.  This paper’s results show how individual legislators will engage in behaviors not 
predicted by previous theories.  Moreover, in many cases, policy outcomes are predicted to be 
more moderate than they would be in the traditional committee dominance literature. 
The paper examines two Internet intellectual property protection bills before the 106th 
Congress, to test implications of the theory.  The descriptive and statistical evidence illustrates 
how jurisdictional wars between committees play out.  The evidence is consistent with the main 
tenets of the paper. 
This paper puts renewed spotlight on the committee jurisdiction literature.  It suggests 
that when scholars examine the relationship between committee behavior and policy outcomes, 
they should be careful to consider the jurisdictional disputes that could potentially arise and how 
that might affect policy outcomes.  Without controlling for this effect, scholars may generate 
spurious results.  The model enclosed will help guide thinking about how these effects play out. 
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Figure 4:  Movements of the Game
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Congress Agriculture
Energy & 
Commerce
Foreign 
Affairs
Governmen
t Operations
Interior/
Insular 
Affairs Judiciary
Science/
Space/
Technology
Small 
Business
Ways & 
Means
Total 
Number of 
Bills
80 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 9
81 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 92% 0% 0% 0% 12
82 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 11
83 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 5
84 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 4
85 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 3
86 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 50% 0% 0% 2
87 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 71% 29% 0% 0% 7
88 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 1
89 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 3
90 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 2
91 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0
92 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 3
93 0% 20% 0% 20% 0% 60% 0% 0% 0% 5
94 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 83% 17% 0% 0% 6
95 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 2
96 9% 0% 0% 18% 0% 45% 27% 0% 0% 11
97 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% 71% 7% 0% 14% 14
98 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 91% 9% 0% 0% 11
99 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 70% 10% 0% 10% 10
100 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 92% 0% 8% 0% 13
101 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 88% 13% 0% 0% 16
102 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% 87% 7% 0% 0% 15
103 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 7
Total 1% 2% 1% 2% 1% 85% 8% 1% 2% 172
TABLE 1: HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON COPYRIGHT BILLS
Internet-related subject area Bill # Bill Name
Date 
Introduced
Primary 
Sponsor
Primary Sponsor 
Committee 
Membership 1st Committee
Copyright HR 1761 Copyright Damages Improvement Act 5/11/1999 Rogan
Judiciary
Commerce Judiciary
Cybersquatting HR 3028 Trademark Cyberpiracy Prevention Act 10/6/2000 Rogan
Judiciary
Commerce Judicary
Digital Signatures HR 1320 Millenium Digital Commerce Act (House) 3/25/1999 Eshoo Commerce Commerce
Digital Signatures HR 1572 Digital Signature Act of 1999 4/27/1999 Gordon
Science
Commerce Science
Digital Signatures HR 1714
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce 
Act 5/6/1999 Bliley Commerce Commerce
Digital Signatures HR 439 Paperwork Elimination Act of 1999 2/2/1999 Talent
Small Business
Education
Govt Reform
Govt Reform
Small Business
Encryption HR 850 Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act 2/25/1999 Goodlatte
Judiciary
Agriculture
Judiciary
Int Relations
Armed Services
Commerce
Intelligence
E-Rate HR 1746 Schools and Libraries Internet Access Act 5/11/1999 Tauzin
Commerce
Resources
Commerce
Ways & Means
E-Rate HR 3011 Truth in Telephone Billing Act 10/5/1999 Bliley Commerce Commerce
E-Rate HR 3022 Rest of the Truth in Telephone Billing Act 10/5/1999 Markey
Commerce
Budget Commerce
E-Rate HR 692 E-Rate Termination Act 2/10/1999 Tancredo
Education
Resources
Int Relations Commerce
E-Rate HR 727 Telecommunications Trust Act 2/11/1999 Klink Commerce
Commerce
Ways & Means
Filtering HR 2560 Child Protection Act 7/20/1999 Istook Appropriations Education
Filtering HR 4600 Children's Internet Protection Act 6/8/2000 Pickering Commerce Commerce
Filtering HR 896 Children's Internet Protection Act 3/2/1999 Franks
Budget
Transportation Commerce
Gambling HR 3125 Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999 10/21/1999 Goodlatte
Judiciary
Agriculture Judiciary
Internet Access HR 1686 Internet Freedom Act 5/5/1999 Goodlatte
Judiciary
Agriculture
Judiciary
Commerce
Internet Access HR 2420
Internet Freedom and Broadband Deployment Act of 
1999 7/1/1999 Tauzin
Commerce
Resources Commerce
Internet Access HR 2637 Consumer and Community Choice in Access Act of 1999 7/29/1999 Blumenauer Transportation Commerce
Junk e-mail HR 1910 E-Mail User Protection Act 5/24/1999 Green Commerce
Commerce
Judiciary
Junk e-mail HR 3113 Unsolicited Electronic Mail Act of 1999 10/20/1999 Heather Wilson
Commerce
Intelligence Commerce
Multiple Areas HR 1685 Internet Growth and Development Act 5/5/1999 Boucher
Judiciary
Commerce
Commerce
Judiciary
On-line alcohol & gun sales HR 2031 Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act 6/7/1999 Scarborough
Judiciary
Armed Services
Govt Reform Judiciary
On-line alcohol & gun sales HR 3020
Electronic Commerce Crime Prevention and Protection 
Act 10/5/1999 Crowley
Resources
Int Relations Judiciary
Piracy/Database Protection HR 1858 Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act 5/19/1999 Bliley Commerce Commerce
Piracy/Database Protection HR 354 Collections of Information Antipiracy Act 1/19/1999 Coble
Judiciary
Transportation Judiciary
Privacy HR 2644 Personal Data Privacy Act of 1999 7/29/1999 Hinchey Appropriations Govt Reform
Privacy HR 313 Consumer Internet Privacy Protection Act of 1999 1/6/1999 Vento
Banking
Resources Commerce
Privacy HR 3321 Electronic Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 1999 11/10/2000 Markey
Commerce
Budget
Commerce/Banking/
Transportation/Agric
ulture
Privacy HR 3560 On-line Privacy Protection Act of 2000 1/31/2000 Frelinghuysen Appropriations Commerce
Privacy HR 367 Social Security On-Line Privacy Protection Act 1/19/1999 Franks
Budget
Transportation Commerce
Privacy HR 369
Children's Privacy Protection and Parental Empowerment 
Act of 1999 1/19/1999 Franks
Budget
Transportation Judiciary
Taxes HR 3252 Internet Tax Elimination Act 11/8/2000 Kasich
Ways & Means
Armed Services
Judicary
Ways & Means
TABLE 2:  MAJOR INTERNET BILLS BEFORE THE 106TH HOUSE
Variable Description
Educational Employment Population in District employed in Educational Sector (000)
Commerce Committee =1 if Commerce Committee Member, 0 otherwise
Science Committee =1 if Science Committee Member, 0 otherwise
Judiciary Committee =1 if Judiciary Committee Member, 0 otherwise
ADA ADA Score
Median Home Value Median Home Value in District (000000)
Median Income Median Income in District (000)
Educational Attainment Population in District having completed 4-year degree (000)
Committee Rank Within Party Rank on the Committee
Election Margin Margin of Victory in Last Election (000)
TABLE 3:  VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
H.R. 353 H.R. 353 H.R. 1858 H.R. 1858
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Educational Employment -0.0083**
(-2.11)
-0.0078**
(-1.99)
0.0004
(0.19)
0.0008
(0.54)
Commerce Committee -0.1014**
(-1.96)
0.2344***
(5.88)
Science Committee -0.0278
(-0.50)
0.0179
(0.71)
Judiciary Committee 0.3350***
(4.55)
-0.0112
(-.49)
ADA -0.0003
(-0.58)
-0.0002
(-.44)
-0.00015
(-0.56)
-0.00003
(-0.21)
Median Home Value 0.0026
(0.07)
-0.0073
(-0.18)
0.0104
(0.48)
0.0018
(0.09)
Median Income 0.0003
(0.78)
0.0036
(0.94)
-0.0016
(-0.72)
-0.0012
(-0.85)
Educational Attainment .0016
(1.08)
0.0017
(1.17)
-0.0001
(-0.17)
-0.0002
(-0.29)
n 435 435 435 435
LL 11.50 37.39 1.45 38.70
Two-sided t-statistics below coefficient estimates
** 95% significance
*** 99% significance
TABLE 4:  ECONOMETRIC RESULTS FROM BILL COSPONSORSHIP
TABLE 5:  COMMERCE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP COSPONSORS
H.R. 1858
Variable Model 5
Educational Employment -0.0063(-0.34)
ADA -0.0008
(-0.54)
Median Home Value -0.0061
(-0.06)
Median Income -0.0044
(-0.39)
Educational Attainment -0.0006
(-0.12)
Committee Rank -0.0256***
(-3.11)
Election Margin 0.0046**
(2.13)
n 53
LL 15.9
Two-sided t-statistics below coefficient estimates
** 95% significance
*** 99% significance
